Since Chomsky's pioneering work on syntactic structures, comparative psychologists interested in the study of language evolution have targeted pattern complexity, using formal mathematical grammars, as the key to organizing language-relevant cognitive processes across species. This focus on formal syntactic complexity, however, often disregards the close interaction in real-world signals between the structure of a pattern and its constituent elements. Whether such features of natural auditory signals shape pattern generalization is unknown. In the present paper, we train birds to recognize differently patterned strings of natural signals (song motifs). Instead of focusing on the complexity of the overtly reinforced patterns, we ask how the perceptual groupings of pattern elements influence the generalization pattern knowledge. We find that learning and perception of training patterns is agnostic to the perceptual features of underlying elements. Surprisingly, however, these same features constrain the generalization of pattern knowledge, and thus its broader use. Our results demonstrate that the restricted focus of comparative language research on formal models of syntactic complexity is, at best, insufficient to understand pattern use.
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Introduction
Theories of syntax are central to understanding language. As a result, many comparative psychologists interested in the study of language evolution have targeted pattern complexity, using formal mathematical grammars, as the key to organizing language-relevant cognitive processes across species (Berwick, Beckers, Okanoya, & Bolhuis, 2012; Berwick, Okanoya, Beckers, & Bolhuis, 2011). In identifying similarities and differences between human and nonhuman animals in relation to pattern recognition and production, some researchers have concluded that comparative models are inadequate because ''human language sentences are potentially unbounded in length and structure, limited only by extraneous factors, such as short-term memory or lung capacity' ' (Berwick et al., 2011) . This focus on formal syntactic complexity, however, disregards the close interaction in real-world signals between the structure of a pattern and its constituent elements as well as core biological and cognitive constraints intrinsic to temporal processing and, therefore, language. Others have argued that comparative studies are essential to the study of language precisely because they showcase how biological and cognitive mechanisms interact with dynamic real-world signals to tune pattern perception mechanisms crucial to aspects of language (Kiggins, Comins, & Gentner, 2012; Margoliash & Nusbaum, 2009 ). The latter perspective proposes to study language and its evolution in the context of the principles of organismal biology (Margoliash & Nusbaum, 2009) , whereas the former posits these questions in the domain of mathematical formalisms specifically unburdened by such restrictions (Berwick et al., 2011 (Berwick et al., , 2012 
